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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XIII FEBRUARY, 1928 NUMBER 2
SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION
IN NEW YORK*
HORAcB E. WHITESIDEt
VI. RESULTS OF TH DEcIsIONs
As Professor Gray so aptly put it,22 "In no civilized country is thE
making of a will so delicate an operation, and so likely to fail of success
as in New York". For proof of the truth of this assertion one needE
examine only a few of the recent volumes of the New York Reports,
and the reports of the inferior courts, and note the number of caseE
in which the validity of future limitations and testamentary trustE
has been litigated.28  And yet the statutes have been in operation
for ninety-seven years. One hesitates to speculate on the number
of titles that might be attacked as depending on wills illegally suspend-
ing the power of alienation. To paraphrase the Revised Statutes
with the additions and amendments thereto, as they have been
construed, the courts have said to the citizen :229
"If you would draw any but the simplest will, you must realize
that it will probably result in long and expensive litigation which will
waste your estate and create lasting and bitter enmities among your
descendants. You may not establish a trust of real property except
for one of the four purposes authorized by statute. Likewise, trusts
for the purpose of accumulations are strictly limited by statute.
You may not create any trust for a gross period, nor one which is
*This is the second and final installment of the article, the first having appeared
in (1927) 13 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 3i.
tProfessor of Law, Cornell Law School.
221GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3d ed. 1915) § 750.
22 1n the last fifteen volumes of the New York Supplement, reporting cases
from the Supreme Court and the inferior courts, at least fifty cases appear whih
involved suspension of alienation by trust, accumulations, vesting or powers.
Only four of these were trusts not created by will. They cover a period of two
years and seven months (Jan. 19, 1925 to Aug. 15, 1927). From May 25, 1926 to
July 20, 1927, opinions were handed down in six cases on these subjects by the
Court of Appeals (supra note 2). Others were argued and disposed of by mem-
oranda.
229In support of the assertions made, see generally the first installment of this
article, (1927) 13 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 31.
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to continue for more than two lives in being at your death, unless
the trust for a gross period is destructible at all times, and the trust
for lives is destructible at all times after two designated lives in being.
You may not create future contingent interests unless the same are
certain to vest within the period of two designated lives in being at
your death. Experience has demonstrated that you may not rely
confidently on the advice of your attorney in these matters. Only
by taking the wisest of counsel may you attempt with any degree
of assurance to make provision for your grandchildren at the death
of your children, or for other descendants of beneficiaries. The
creation of trusts and future interests by you in your lifetime is
limited in like manner.
"If you would create a trust for the preservation of your estate,
and to pay rents, income and profits to your widow and descendants
or other relatives, you must create a spendthrift thrust; no other kind
will be permitted; and after you have created this spendthrift trust,
the courts will destroy your most cherished wishes, if the trust you
have attempted to create may by any possibility continue during
the lives of more than two of the objects of your bounty. If you
leave only two dependents, you may safely provide for them by a
trust during their lives, but you must not go further. If you are
survived by more than two dependents, the difficulty of such provision
is increased many fold. It is the policy of the laws of this state to
discriminate against a testator who leaves more than two dependents,
and to discourage the use by him of trusts as a means of providing
for beneficiaries. Such testator may accomplish his object by creating
a separate trust for each beneficiary, but his intention must be clearly
indicated. The fund set apart for each beneficiary may be held in
trust during only two designated lives of persons in being at the
death of the testator, and it must be disposed of absolutely at the
termination of such lives.
"We will indicate a few signposts to be your dim and uncertain
guides. The purposes for which trusts of personal property may
be created are not limited by statute, and where the trustee has a
power and duty to convert real property into personal property, the
rules as to the latter will apply. Trusts which can be revoked at
the will of the settlor may be lawfully created to continue for a
term of years or beyond two lives in being, but the power of
revocation should be expressly reserved. Likewise, trusts which
can be destroyed at the option of the beneficiary or trustee are not
destroyed by the statute. Therefore, give your executor or trustee
an absolute power not only to exchange, or sell and reinvest the
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property held by him, but also an absolute discretion to terminate
his trust or holding, effective at least at all times after two designated
lives in being. A like power in the beneficiary of the trust to call for
a termination of the trust and a distribution of the fund, at any time
after two designated lives in being, will save the trust. You may
provide for legacies of fixed amounts payable in a lump sum or in
installments, or annuities of fixed sums where not dependent on
income or profits of a trust fund, by means of a charge or power.
Other powers and powers in trust must be so framed as not to suspend
the power of alienation beyond two designated lives in being.
"Direct no accumulation of the income of property except for the
benefit of an infant, and unless it is to commence within two lives
in being, and during the life of the infant for whose sole benefit the
accumulation is directed, and such accumulation must end with the
majority of the infant, and the fund so accumulated must then be
paid over to him absolutely. Further than this, certain accumulations
may be created for charitable purposes in accordance with the
provisions of special statutes. Whenever possible indicate your
intention that future interests be vested in persons who must certainly
be in esse and ascertained at the termination of not more than two
lives in being. Never create a contingent future interest which is
to vest after a term of years or after more than two lives in being
at the creation of the interest. It is immaterial that such future
interest may be alienable."
VII. WHETHER THESE RESULTS ARE JUSTIFIED
A reasonable doubt may be expressed whether the results of the
cases set forth in the first installment of this article are desirable, or
the decisions of the courts justified in respect of the following points:
First, in holding that the statutes against suspending the power of
alienation and the absolute ownership of property were directed at
such suspension by trusts; Second, in reaching this result in respect
of trusts of personal property; and Third, in holding that a rule
against remoteness of vesting is in force in New York.
THE REVISED STATUTES WERE NOT DIRECTED AT SUSPENSION
OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION BY TRUSTS
Summary of the statutory provisions. It is submitted that the
Revised Statutes were not directed at suspension of the power of
alienation by trusts. In the title devoted to the "Nature and Qualities
of Estates in Real Property, and the Alienation thereof," 0 after
23OSupra notes I and 5. The sections referred to in this paragraph are now con-
tained in Art. 3 of the Real Property Law, § § 3o et seg.
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defining estates of inheritance, estates for life, and estates for years,
and abolishing the estate tail (converting it into a fee), the legislature
proceeds in sections 7 and 8 to divide estates, in respect of the time
of their enjoyment, into estates in possession, and estates in ex-
pectancy, defining the former as an estate "where the owner has an
immediate right to the possession of the land," and the latter as an
estate "where the right to the possession is postponed to a future
period." In section 9 estates in expectancy are further divided into
"estates commencing at a future day," or future estates, and re-
versions. In section io it is provided that future estates include
those limited to commence in possession at a future day either
without the intervention of a precedent estate or on the determination
of a precedent estate, thereby embracing common law remainders
and reversions, as well as springing and shifting uses and executory
devises. In section 13 future estates are defined as either vested or
contingent and a test is given for determining their character in this
respect.3 ' Sections 14, 15 and 16 have been quoted above;ui section
14 defines suspension of the power of alienation and provides against
such suspension by the creation of future estates; section 15 provides
against suspension "by any limitation or condition whatever" and
defines the period within which the power of alienation may legally
be suspended; and section 16 provides for the exceptional case of
suspension during a minority following two lives. Subsequent
sections provide that not more than two successive life estates shall
be created;S that no remainder shall be limited on an estate pur
autre vie unless it be a remainder in fee ;4 that remainders shall be
accelerated in certain cases;23 that a contingent remainder in a term
of years shall not be created unless it must vest in interest by the
end of not more than two lives in being,26 etc. By section 23 all
the provisions relative to future estates are made applicable to chattels
real. This is followed by provisionsu7 permitting the creation of
freehold estates and chattel interests to commence at a future day;
estates for life and remainders vested or contingent in a term of years;
a fee upon a fee; two or more future estates in the alternative;2s8 and
remainders by way of conditional limitations.2 9 Certain rules of
231"Future estates are either vested or contingent. They are vested, when
there is a person in being, who would have an immediate right to the possession
of the lands, upon the ceasing of the intermediate or precedent estate. They are
contingent, while the person to whom, or the event upon which they are limited to
take effect, remains uncertain." Now R. P. L. § 40.
2ZSupra notes IO6, 188. =R. S. § 17, R. P. L. 43.
mR. S. § I8, R. P. L. § 44. mR. S. § I9, R. P. L. 45.2 %R. S. § 2o, R. P. L. § 4 6. 23R. S. § 24 , R. P. L. § 5o.2
"'R. S. § 25, R. P. L. § 51. MR. S. § 27 , R. P. L. § 53.
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construction are laid down and the common law rules of destructibility
of contingent remainders are abolished. By section 35 expectant
estates are made descendible, devisable and alienable, in the same
manner as estates in possession. Section 36 provides that dispositions
of rents and profits of land, to accumulate subsequent to the execution
of the instrument creating such disposition shall be governed by the
rules established in relation to future estates in lands. This is followed
by sections providing for legal accumulation of rents and profits
within limits,20 and other sections not material to our problem.
In the second article of the same title21 uses and trusts in land
are abolished for the future except for the four classes preserved in
section fifty-five,m passive trusts are converted into legal estates,W
resulting trusts abolished in certain cases and regulated in others.2"
Section fifty-seven makes surplus rents and profits of a trust, beyond
the sun necessary for the education and support of the beneficiary,
liable in equity to the claims of creditors. Sections 58 and 59 provide
that certain attempted trusts shall be effective as powers in trust,
and the title shall remain in or pass to the persons entitled thereto,
subject to the execution of the power. Section 6o provides that the
trustee of a valid express trust shall have the "whole estate..., in
law and in equity, subject only to the execution of the trust" and
the beneficiary shall take "no estate or interest in the lands, but may
enforce the performance of the trust in equity." This section is
explained in the two following sections as has been indicated.2
Section 63 provides that no beneficiary can assign or in any manner
dispose of his interest, unless it is "for the payment of a sum in gross."
Section 64 provides, "where an express trust is created, but is not
contained or declared in the conveyance to the trustees, such con-
veyance shall be deemed absolute as against the subsequent creditors
of the trustees," without notice, and as against subsequent purchasers
for value without notice. But in section 65, "where the trust shall
be expressed in the instrument vesting the estate, every sale, con-
veyance or other act of the trustees, in contravention of the trust
shall be absolutely void." Subsequent sections of this article deal
with the termination of trust interests. The third article deals with
powers.
240R. S. § 37, R. P. L. § 61, in part.
2tNow Art. 4 of the R. P. L. §§ 90 el seq.
2*R. S. § 45, R. P. L. §§ 91, 96. 2"R. S. §§ 47, 5o, R. P. L. §§ 92, 93.
244R. S. §§ 50-54, R. P. L. §§ 94,95.
24Supra (,927) 13 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 41-43.
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The language of these statutes does not justify the interpretations that
have been read into them. An examination of these sections of the
Revised Statutes nowhere discloses any express provision subjecting
trusts to the operation of the rule against suspension of the power
of alienation unless it be the concluding phrase of section 55 (3),
"subject to the rules prescribed in the first Article of this title."
It is upon this slender foundation that the whole mighty structure
has been raised. As to the first article, the estate of the trustee under
sections 7 and 8 must necessarily be an estate in possession, since he is
the "owner" by virtue of section 6o and has "an immediate right to
the possession of the land," and his estate cannot by any means be
construed into an estate in expectancy or a future estate within
sections 9 and io. By section 6o, again, the beneficiary has "no
estate or interest in the lands," either in possession or in expectancy,
but only a personal right against the trustee. By section 14 it is
future estates which are void for suspension of the power of alienation.
By section 15 the prohibition is against suspension of alienation by
a "limitation or condition." By reason of the fact that the revisers
originally proposed two sections which were combined by the legis-
lature into section 15, one of which (the original section 17)2 referred.
to future estates and the other (originally section 15) did not expressly
refer to future estates, the argument was made, and successfully,27
that it was the intention of the revisers to provide against suspension
of the power of alienation of present interests in their section 15, and
against suspension of the power of alienation by future estates in
their section 17, and that this intention was adopted by the legislature
when the two sections were combined. This argument is open to
two objections: (i) it assumes that the legislature adopted this
hypothetical intention, whereas the combination of the sections
indicates the contrary; (2) it assumes that the original section 15
was directed against suspension of alienation by present interests.
If true, it must be said that the revisers, who were men of great
erudition and ordinarily given to great clarity of expression, in this
case, concealed their meaning in enigmatic words. It is improbable
246"In every creation of a future estate, the absolute power of alienation shall
not be suspended longer than the lives of two persons then in being."
247Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265, 305, 319 (N. Y. 1835). Cf. s. c., s Paige,
172, 213, 219 (N. Y. Chan. 1835). Since §§ I4, 15 and I6 of the R. S. were com-
bined in § 32 of the R. P. L. of z896 (now § 42 R. P. L.), there is even less statutory
justification for the holding that the suspension of alienation by present trusts is
prohibited by the statute. See the report of the Board of Statutory Consolidation
(1907), pages 4896-7, quoted in book 49 of McKinney's Consolidated Laws of
N. Y., page 62.
SUSPENSION OF ALIENATION IN NEW YORK 173
that a result so important and far-reaching would have been intended
to result from such ambiguous language. It is much more probable
that section 15 was directed at suspension of the power of alienation
by future limitations and conditions, which would be intelligible to one
versed in the common law of real property, and that the qualification
in section 55 (3) was intended to make it clear that estates in trust
could be created in the same way as ordinary legal estates, but
subject to the same limitations when created by way of future
estates.248
The notes of the Revisers. If we turn to the notes of the revisers,
we find no intimation either in the notes to Article First, or in those
to Article Second, that they feared suspension of alienation by trusts,
or that the statutes were directed at suspension of alienation by
present vested interests. In their notes the revisers express the belief
that the proposed statutes will, "extricate this branch of the law,
from the perplexity and obscurity in which it is now involved, and
render a system simple, uniform, and intelligible, which, in its present
state, is various, complicated and abstruse." 9 And later they say:
"The interests of society require that the power of the owner
to fetter the alienation and suspend the ownership of an estate
by future limitations, should be confined within certain limits".2 50
After pointing out the confusion in the common law in respect of the
three classes of future estates (remainders, springing and secondary
uses, and executory devises), each with its technical rules as to
creation and destruction, the revisers expressed a wish to,
"...abolish all technical rules and distinctions, having no
relation to the essential nature of property and the means of its
beneficial enjoyment .... to define with precision the limits within
which the power of alienation may be suspended by the creation
of contingent estates, and to reduce all expectant estates substan-
tially to the same class, and apply to them the same rules whether
created by deed or devise. '251
In their notes to section io, they say:
"As future estates cannot, under the following sections of
this Article, create a suspension of ownership, for a longer
21sSee Kane v. Gott, 24 Wend. 641, 662 (N. Y. i84O), quoted infra p. z8o.
2 4O9Report of the Revisers to the Legislature (1828), Part II, Chap. I, p. 21.
The notes of the revisers follow Article First. They also appear in the second and
third editions of the Revised Statutes.
The revisers appeared as counsel in Hawley v. James, infra note 254; Coster v.
Lorillard, supra note 247, and other early cases. Their arguments are given
in the reports of these cases, but it is not believed that their true intention can
be found in such partisan arguments.
2501W. Note that "future limitahons" are objected to.
25mlbid. Italics are author's.
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period than remainders, no rules of public policy are violated by
their permission."
25 2
They speak repeatedly of the objection to rendering property inalien-
able, and the way in which this is done, and never clearly of any
objection to mere remoteness of vesting. They say:
"... an estate is never inalienable, unless there is a contingent
remainder, and a contingency has not yet occurred. Where the
remainder is vested .... there is no suspense of the power of
alienation, for the remainderman and the owner of the prior
estate, by uniting, may always convey the whole estate. This is
the meaning of the rule of law prohibiting perpetuities, and is
the effect of the definition in § 14."2-5
It is nowhere intimated that they intended to substitute a system
which is certainly more complicated than the common law knew,
consisting of a rule against suspension of the power of alienation by
contingent future interests, a rule against remoteness of vesting,
a rule against suspension of the power of alienation of specific property
by trusts, and a rule making illegal any indestructible trust, limited
to continue beyond two lives in being, whether or not the trustee
has power to sell or exchange the specific trust property.2 4 There is
nowhere any suggestion that the statutes were directed against
suspension of the power of alienation by trusts, or that they intended
to introduce on this point a complicated rule which was unknown
to the common law. At common law trusts neither suspended the
power of alienation 5 nor violated any rule against remoteness of
25Ibid. 22. 253Ibid. 23.
2
s
4Hawley v. James, 5 Paige, 318, 444 (N. Y. Chan. 1835), aff'd, 16 Wend. 6i,
163 (N. Y. 1836); Savage v. Burnham, 17 N. Y. 561 (1858). Accord: Grand
Rapids Tr. Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321, 19o N. W. 25o (1922); Beckerv. Chester,
115 Wis. 90, 91 N. W. 87, 650 (19o2). Cf. Michigan Tr. Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich.
72, 196 N. W. 976 (1924), effect of equitable conversion.
Section 228 of the proposed Civil Code of I865 provides, "The suspension of all
power to alienate the subject of a trust, other than a power to exchange it for
other property to be held upon the same trust, is a suspension of the power of
alienation, within the meaning of section 201." This was said to be declaratory
of the existing law. The notes to § 2oi (which is based on R. S. § 15) state that
any limitation or condition includes a trust of real property. Cf. § 172, quoted
infra note 264, and similar provisions in the proposed code of 1872, § 40; proposed
code of 1884, §§ 280, 281, 321.
25In Lorillard v. Coster, 5 Paige, 172, 213 (N. Y. Chan. 1835), Chancellor
Walworth expressed the opinion that all the trusts and limitations attempted
in the will were valid, citing Cadell v. Palmer, and continued, "I know of no way
in which a present vested interest in real property could have been rendered
absolutely inalienable previous to the adoption of the Revised Statutes. The
only way in which a conveyance of an absolute fee could be prevented, was
by the limitation of a future or contingent interest or estate in the property, in
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vesting,26 though unvested interests following a trust might be open
to objection on either of these grounds. So at common law no ob-
jection to the duration of a trust was raised where all of the interests
were vested,2s7 and it was possible by the better rule for a competent
cestui que trust of full age to call for a conveyance from the trustee and
thereby terminate the trust.2ss The revisers wished to simplify the
rules of the common law and not to make them more complicated.
By reading into the system devised by them a rule against suspension
of the power of alienation by present interests, by way of trusts, the
courts have given us an exceedingly complicated and artificial
system.5 8sa
favor of a person not in esse, or in favor of one who was not ascertained at the time
of the creation of such estate or interest."
The cestui que trust may, unless restrained by the trust instrument, convey his
interest: Hiss v. Hiss, 228 Ill. 414, 81 N. E. O56 (1907); Elliott v. Armstrong,
2 Blackf. 198, 208 (Ind. 1829); Sprague v. Moore, 13o Mich. 92, 89 N. W. 712
(1902), conveyance to trustee valid. For other cases, see BOGERT, TRusTs
(1921) 433-435 The doctrine of Claflin v. Claflin, infra note 258, arose long
after the adoption of the Revised Statutes.
n6Hart v. Seymour, 147 111. 598,613,35 N. E. 246 (1893); Pulitzerv. Livingston,
89 Me. 359, 36 Atl. 635 (1896); Harlow v. Cowdrey, 1O9 Mass. 183 (1872); GRAY,
PERPETUITIES (3d ed. 1915) §§ 232--237d, 245c-245e, 895-909.
n'For the orthodox doctrine, see supra note 256. Cf. (1924) 9 CORNELL LAW
QUARTERLY 422, 428 et seq., for argument contra. Cf. also Fraser, Suspension of
the Power of Alienation (1925) 9 MINN. L. Rnv. 314, 324.
But if no equitable interest under the trust may arise within the limits of the
rule against perpetuities, the trust will be void: Mainwaring v. Baxter, (1894)
2 Ch. 31o; In re Bewick, (1911) 1 Ch. 116; GRAY, op. cit. supra note 256, § 413.
naSaunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115 (Ch. 1841); Wharton v. Masterman,
(1895) A. C. 186; Ealde v. Ingram, 142 Calif. 15, 75 Pac. 566 (19o4); Huber v.
Donaghue, 49 N. J. Eq. 125, 23 Atl. 495 (1891); Turnage v. Green, 55 N. C. 63
(1854).
But the majority of American jurisdictions have followed Claflin v. Claflin,
149 Mass. 19, 20 N. E. 454 (1889), which permitted the settlor to create an
absolute and indefeasible equitable interest in the beneficiary, and then provide
that it should be indestructible for a period beyond the minority of the beneficiary.
The authorities are collecetd in BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 255, at 580-582.
For a discussion of possible limitations on the duration of such trusts, see
GRAY, oP. cit. supra note 256, § 121i; (1924) 9 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 428-
431; (1911) 1o MIcH. L. REv. 31, 37.
2saBut the courts have continued to eulogize the revisers and praise the sim-
plicity of the statutory system: See the opinion of Savage, C. J., in Coster v.
Lorillard, supra note 247, at 297, 298. He thought that the devise in question
would have been valid at common law, and then commented on the effort of the
revisers to "extricate this branch of the law from the perplexity and obscurity in
which it was involved; and render a system simple, uniform and intelligible,
which was various, complicated and abstruse."
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The revisers did not intend to restrain alienation of his interest by a
competent cestui que trust. Even conceding that a rule against
suspension of the power of alienation of present interests was intended,
it is doubtful if it was within the intention of the revisers by section
63 to prevent a competent cestui que trust of full age from alienating
his interest. This would be a radical innovation on the common law,
and yet no mention is made of it in the notes of the revisers, but there
is evidence that the section was intended for the benefit of married
women, infants, and incompetents. Subdivision 3 of section 55, as
originally proposed provided for trusts of rents and profits for the
"education and support, or support only, of any person..." This
was changed by the legislature to "education and support or either,"
and in 183o was changed to "use". When this provision is read in
the light of its transition, and in connection with the notes of the
revisers,25 9 it seems they intended to authorize such trusts at least
primarily for persons under some disability, and by section 63 quite
Senator Young, ibid. 369 admitted there would have been no difficulty at
common law, and said, "The views of the chancellor and vice chancellor, on
several important points, conflict with each other; no two of the revisers agree
on the argument, in their expositions of those sections of the statute which are
supposed to have a material influence upon the decision of this cause; and of the
seven learned counsel, there was no one who did not disagree with all the rest,
both in his premises and conclusions."
Andrews, J., in Walker v. Marcellus,.etc., Ry., 226 N.Y. 347, 350, 123 N. E.
736 (I919), speaking of the revisers, said, "Their design was to simplify, not to
complicate, the transfer of real e9tate-to restrict, not to extend, the limitations
which a grantor might impose upon it."
Cf. also Senator Mack in Hawley v. James, supra note 254, at 205; In re United
States Trust Co., 78 Misc. 227, 234, 138 N. Y. Supp. 156 (1912).
25 Notes of Revisers, supra note 249, at 42: "As the creation of trusts is always
in a greater or less degree a source of inconvenience and expense... express
trusts should be limited as far as possible, and the purposes for which they may
be created, strictly defined. The object of the Revisers in this section is to allow
the creation of express trusts,.. only where the purposes of the trust require
that the legal estate should pass to the trustee. An assignment for the benefit
of creditors, would in most cases be entirely defeated, if the title were to remain
in the debtor, and where the trust is to receive the rents and profits of lands, and to
apply them to the education of a minor, the separate use of a married woman,
or the support of a lunatic or spendthrift, (the general objects of trusts of this
description) the utility of vesting the title and possession in the trustees, is suffi-
ciently apparent." (Note to revisers' § 56, enacted as R. S. § 55.) The revisers
also, speak repeatedly in their notes of the desirability of protecting creditors, a
purpose which seems to have been defeated by the broad interpretation given
to § 63.
Cf. the opinion of McCoun, V. C., in Lorillard v. Coster, supra note 255, at
187-8; DeGraw v. Clason, ii Paige, 136, 140 (1844); Proposed Civ. Code
(1865) § 285; Proposed Civ. Code (1884) § 401.
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properly restrained such beneficiaries from alienating their interests.
When the language was amended to read "use", and when trusts to
pay over were authorized there was obviously no longer any limitation
on the persons for whom such trusts could be created, or the manner
in which the funds should be applied.2 60 A corresponding limitation
on the scope of section 63 should have been enacted, or read into it
by construction. The present absurd result, that the interest of the
cestui que trust of every trust under this subdivision is absolutely
inalienable, voluntarily or involuntarily, and cannot be made alienable
by direction of the settlor or of the Supreme Court, was certainly
never intended by the revisers nor by the legislature.2 160
Object of making alienation by trustee void. Turning to sections 64
and 65, the object of the revisers in these sections seems to have
been to confirm secret trusts (trusts not declared in the conveyance
to the trustee or in the will of the testator) only as against the trustee
and his prior creditors and subsequent creditors and purchasers with
notice, but where the trust was expressed in the instrument vesting
the estate, all the world was given notice thereof, and the provision
that "every sale, conveyance or other act of the trustees, in con-
travention of the trust shall be absolutely void" was little more than
declaratory of the common law rule as to purchasers from a trustee
with notice of his breach of trust.2 1' It is significant that no corre-
sponding section was enacted in respect of trusts of personal property
which might be created by parol without written record.
If it be admitted that the fact that the trustee does not have the
power to alienate the trust estate suspends the power of alienation as
to such property, then one looks in vain for a provision of the sections
dealing with real property, which logically supports the universal
holding of the cases that a power of sale in the trustee, the resulting
funds to continue subject to the trust, is not such a power of alienation
as is required by the statute. Sections 14, 15 and 16211 would seem
to be directed at inalienability resulting from the creation of future
contingent estates, or from limitations and conditions in the creation
of estates. The interpretation by which they are held to prohibit
the continuance of an indestructible trust beyond two lives in being
may possibly produce a desirable result, but it is difficult to support
by any reading of the statutes. This difficulty arises from the fact
26
°Notes of Revisers, supra note 249, at 33, 34. Cf. Proposed Civ. Code (1865)
§ 285; i d. (1884) § 401.26
°aCf. Proposed Civ. Code (1865) §§ 295, 296; ibid. (1884) §§ 411, 412.
2
'Notes of Revisers, supra note 249, at 43. Cf. Proposed Civ. Code (1865)
§§ 291, 298; ibid (1884) §§ 407, 414.
262Supra notes io6, 188.
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that the revisers were concerned with suspension of the power of
alienation by future estates, contingent as to the person, and vesting
at a time too remote, and by remote limitations and conditions, and
their language is simply not applicable to indestructible trusts and
inalienable present interests.
AS TO TRUSTS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
The decisions by which the courts held that trusts of personal
property suspended the absolute ownership of such property are still
more difficult to support. The meaning of "suspension of the absolute
ownership" has been defined above as practically equivalent to
"suspension of the absolute power of alienation."2 0 The difference
of language between sections 14 and 15, and the personal property
section can probably be explained by the fact that the personal
property section was drafted later 2  and possibly by a different hand.
Perhaps an argument could be made that absolute ownership requires
an undivided ownership, not subject to any trust or limitation, but
such an argument would rest solely on the difference in wording.
The notes of the revisers to the personal property sections indicate
that they thought it desirable to bring the rules governing future
interests in personal property into harmony with the real property
rules on this point. The language of section i1 prohibits suspension
of the absolute ownership "by any limitation of condition," and in
section 2,2 6 it is provided:
"In all other respects, limitations of future or contingent
interests in personal property, shall be subject to the rules pre-
scribed in the first Chapter of this Act, in relation to future estates
in lands."
No sections corresponding to sections 6o to 65 were enacted for
personal property. No prohibition against alienation was imposed
on the trustee or cestui que trust. Nor were any restrictions placed
on the purposes for which trusts of personal property could be created.
If therefore, the construction adopted, that trusts of real property
suspended the power of alienation, is open to criticism, a fortiori,
263Notes of Revisers, supra note 249, at 49-51.
264Report of Revisers, supra note 249, vol. V, pages 16, 17. The personal
property sections are embodied in R. S., Part II, Chap. IV, Title IV, now P. P. L.
§I1.
The Proposed Civ. Code (1865) defined absolute ownership (§ 172) as follows:
"The ownership of property is absolute, when a single person has the absolute
dominion over it, and may use it or dispose of it according to his pleasure, subject
only to general laws." This provision was copied in Proposed Civ. Code (1884)
§ 280.
2
'Now P. P. L. § ii, in part. 26'Now P. P. L. § ii, in part.
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the corresponding holding in respect of trusts of personal property
is totally unwarranted. The courts nevertheless did apply to trusts
of personal property the same rules which they read into the real
property sections. This was accomplished hesitantly at first, and
under cover of section 2 of the personal property statute.2 7 As
applied to limitations of future or contingent interests in personal
property, 65 there can be no quarrel with this result, but the judges
were not slow in striving for a uniform rule, applicable to all classes
of property in all respects.
It will be interesting to quote the language of some of the judges
in respect of rules governing trusts of personal property. In Hone
v. Van Schaick,2 9 Chancellor Walworth said:
2 q-lam v. Van Orden, 84 N. Y. 257, 270 (i88), expectant interests in personal
property alienable; Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N. Y. 522, 544 (1881), real property
scheme of powers applies to personal property; Smith v. Edwards, 88 N. Y. 93,
1o3 (1882), vesting; Bliven v. Seymour, 88 N. Y. 469, 478 (1882), tenancy in
common in a future interest; Cook v. Lowry, 95 N. Y. 1o3, n1o (1884), rules for
disposition of surplus accumulation of real property applicable to personal
property; Greenland v. Waddell, ii6 N. Y. 234, 242, 22 N. E. 367 (1889), power
of Supreme Court to control trusts, etc; Mills v. Husson, 14o N. Y. 99, 35 N. E.
422 (1893), discharge of trusts for creditors after 25 years; Fargo v. Squiers,
154 N. Y. 250, 258, 48 N. E. 5o9 (1897), relation back in law of powers; Matter
of Brown, I54 N. Y. 313, 324, 48 N. E. 37 (1897), "rules governing estates or
interests in lands, whether founded upon statutes or general principles of law, are,
so far as practicable, applied to interests or estates of a like character in personal
property," citing § 2; Steinway v. Steinway, 163 N. Y. 183, I96, 57 N. E. 312
(igoo), meaning of "heirs"; Rudd v. Cornell, 58 App. Div. 207, 216, 68 N. Y.
Supp. 757 (goi), aff'd, 171 N. Y. 114, 63 N. E. 823 (1902) can designate "re-
mainder in fee" in personal property; Matter of Conger, 81 App. Div. 493, 503,
8o N. Y. Supp. 933 (19o3), rule against three successive life estates; Schlereth v.
Schlereth, 173 N.Y. 44, 66 N. E. 130 (1903), meaning of "heirs"and"issue";
Reilly v. Reilly, 82 App. Div. 374, 81 N. Y. Supp. 861 (1903), aff'd, 176 N. Y.
597, 68 N. E. 1116 (i9o3), rule as to passive trusts; Tuthillv. Davis, 121 App.
Div. 290, 1O5 N. Y. Supp. 672 (1907), rules as to defeating expectant estates;
N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Carey, 191 N. Y. 33, 83 N. E. 598 (igo8), section making
expectant estates descendible, devisable and alienable; National Park Bank v.
Billings, 144 App. Div. 536, 129 N. Y. Supp. 846 (i9ii), aff'd, 203 N. Y. .556,
96 N. E. 1122 (1911), alienability of future contingent interests; Matter of
Horteau, 2o4 N. Y. 292, 97 N. E. 726 (1912), "person presumptively entitled
to next eventual estate"; Matter of DePuy, 194 App. Div. 796, 185 N. Y. Supp.
817 (1920), vesting. See also cases cited, supra note 69, first installment of this
article (1927) 13 CORNELL LAw QUARTERLY 44.
Cf. Matter of Crossman, 113 N. Y. 503, 51o, 21 N. E. 180 (1889), "The pro-
vision of the Revised Statutes (§ 40) strictly applies only to the rents and profits
of real estate. But, by analogy, the same rule should, probably, be applied to
the income of personal estate."
26
"National Park Bank v. Billings, supra note 267, at 541.
2"7 Paige, 221, 234 (N. Y. Chan. 1838).
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"The limitation of a trust of personal estate, to receive the
future interest or income thereof and to apply it to the use of
the cestui que trust for life or any shorter period... renders the
interest of the cestui que trust in such income inalienable,
according to the provisions of the sixty-third section of the same
article."
The decision was unanimously affirmed in the Court for the Correction
of Errors,27 0 Bronson, J., stating, however, that "no distinction was
made on the argument between the real and personal property
included in the trust." In Kane v. Gott,271 Cowan, J., denied that
personal property trusts were governed by the same rules as those
involving real property. He said:
"The revised Statutes concerning uses and trusts, i R.S. 721,
2d ed., have of themselves nothing to do with personal property,
either directly or by reference. . . There is nothing in any part
of the statute tying up the trust in personal property to receiving
and applying the income to the use of any person, or otherwise
restricting the mode of appropriation. The third subdivision
speaks of the rents and profits of lands only ... It is supposed
that i R.S. 761, 2, 2d ed., § i and 2, place both real and personal
property on the same narrow footing as to a declaration of trust.
But that is not so. These sections relate exclusively to limita-
tions of future or contingent interests in personal property, making
them subjects to the same rules as limitations of future estates in
lands. The word limitation, when applied to future or contingent
estates, regards the time at, or condition upon which they are
to vest, either as an interest or in possession. .. When the interest
is vested, this may be long or short according to the pleasure or
caprice of the donor, because the land may always be aliened.
But when the limitation is on a contingency it must be confined
within certain boundaries of time; otherwise you run into an
objectionable perpetuity. This is about all that is meant by the
various provisions of the revised statutes against perpetuities."
Judge Cowan then quoted from the notes of the revisers and expressed
his opinion that the rules as to trusts of real property should not be
extended. 212 In Everitt v. Everitt,2 3 it was apparently assumed that a
27020 Wend. 564 (N. Y. 1838).
27124 Wend. 641, 661, 662 (N. Y, 184o). Followed in Fellows v. Heermans, 4
Lans. 230, 239 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1870); Forsyth v. Rathbone, 34 Barb. 388, 4o8
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 186o). But see DePeyster v. Clendening, 8 Paige, 295, 309 (N. Y.
Chan. I84O).
272"I know that in the case of real estate, § 14 has been extended by construction
to a vested interest under § 55 and § 63. But that was grounded on the restraint
of alienation arising from the mode of appropriating rents and profits in a trust
of real estate, and real estate only; not by reason of contingent limitation. In
the case of personal property, we are still left to the rule in the revisers' note.
We are, on the point of perpetuity, to regard the contingent character of the limita-
tion along... ", at p. 662. 27329 N. Y. 39 (1864).
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trust of personal property would occasion suspension of alienation,
but the decision was put on other grounds. In Graff v. Bon-ntt,27 4
on which all subsequent cases rely, the majority of the court thought
the interest of a cestui que trust in a trust of personal property was
inalienable by reason of section 2 of the personal property statute,
by legislative policy and in order to accomplish the purpose of the
revised statutes, but the decision was put on another ground. Denio,
Ch. J. (Johnson, J., concurring) in an able and careful opinion stated
that section 63 did not apply to personal property.275
"The argument which would annex this provision to trusts of
personal property, would be equally strong to bring that species
of property within the influence of all the provisions of the article
concerning uses and trusts; and upon that position no trust of
personal property could be created for purposes not within the
scope of the fifty-fifth section of the article on uses and trusts.
But the rule is notoriously otherwise."
In Williams v. Thorn,216 it was held that under section 57 a judgment
creditor could reach the surplus income of a personal property trust,
Rapalo, J., saying:
"As to the surplus income of personal property, it is likewise
so applicable (to creditors). If it is alienable by the debtor, the
cases concede that it can be reached. If inalienable it is so only
by virtue of § 63; and if § 63 applies to trusts of personalty then
§ 57 also applies and subjects the surplus income to the claims
of creditors."
And in Cochrane v. Schell,277 a case involving the question whether a
trust could be created under section 55, subdivision 3, for the payment
of annuities, and if so, whether such annuitants could alienate their
interests, Chief Judge Andrews by euphonious words dealt the fatal
blow to the distinction between real and personal property trusts:
"There is a manifest propriety in assimilating as far as practi-
cable the rules governing trusts and limitations of real and per-
sonal property, and the tendency in this direction has been very
marked in the decisions of the courts (citations). It would be
unfortunate, we think, if it was necessary to distinguish between
trusts of real and personal property for the payment of annuities
of income, holding such trusts valid as to one species of property
and void as to the other."
In 1893 section 63 was amended to permit the cestui que trust -of
a trust of real or personal property to acquire the remainder and then
destroy the trust. When this statute was repealed in 1903, a statute
prohibiting alienation by the beneficiaries of both classes of trusts
27431 N. Y. 9 (1865). 27rIbid. 18, i9.
2714 I N. Y. 516, 534, 35 N. E. 971 (1894).
2767o N. Y. 270, 278 (1877).
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was enacted.278 Since that date it has been held that passive trusts
of personal property are executed by analogy to the real property
statute, and title passes to the beneficiary.279 Furthermore, it has
been held that the interest of a beneficiary of a personal property
trust is inalienable though the trust was created in i879.280 It may
now be said that trusts of personal property are governed by the real
property rules except in respect of the purposes for which such
trusts may be created. So much has been sacrificed to the desire
for uniformity that it would not be surprising to find the courts
holding in the future that personal property trusts can only be created
for the purposes specified in section 55.
It may be desirable that the rules governing trusts of real and
personal property shall be uniform, but it is submitted that different
considerations of policy govern the tying up of estates in land for
the future from those which apply to personal property which is
ordinarily a source of profit to the owner only from being used and
invested. Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin, all of which adopted
the New York statutes as to real property,281 rejected the sections
applicable to personal property, and yet all seem to have prospered
notwithstanding this omission. Michigan held the common law rules
against perpetuities still applicable to personal property,28 while
Wisconsin and Minnesota reached a contrary result.2 1 In 1925,
however, Wisconsin adopted the New York statute as to personal
property.28 It is to be hoped that good fortune will attend her courts
in treading the maze marked out by the New York decisions.
AS TO THE RULE AGAINST REMOTENESS
There has been a sharp conflict of opinion whether the revisers
and the legislature in i828 intended a rule against suspension of the
278Supra note 70, (1927) 13 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 44.279Reilly v. Reilly, supra note 267; Matter of DeRycke, 99 App. Div. 596,
91 N. Y. Supp. i59 (1904).
28'Stringer v. Young, igi N. Y. I57, 83 N. E. 690 (i908).
Ssee the articles cited supra note 4, first installment of this paper, (1927) x3
CoRNELL LAW QUARTERLY 32.
28 Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552, 2 N. W. 814 (1879); Mich. Trust Co. v.
Baker, supra note 254.
2 3Inre Towers Estate, 49 Minn. 371, 52 N. W. 27 (1892); In re Trust of Bell,
147 Minn. 62, 179 N. W. 650 (1920); Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis. 70, I N. W. 92
(1879); Becker v. Chester, 1I5 Wis. 9o , 9i N. W. 87, 650 (1902). For an excellent
discussion of this problem in Minnesota, see Fraser, op. cir. supra note 4, page
32 of this volume, (1925) 9 MiNN. L. REv. 314.
284Wis. Stat. (1925), § 230.14, was amended by adding, "Limitations of future
or contingent interests in personal property are subject to the rules prescribed
in relation to future estates in real property,. . ." (not retroactive). See Rundell,
op. cit. supra note 4, page 32 of this volume, (1926) 4 Wis. L. REv. 1, 20.
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power of alienation simply, or a rule against remoteness of vesting
also. This dispute is complicated by the further uncertainty as to
whether the common law rule against perpetuities was, at the time
of the adoption of the Revised Statutes, a rule against remoteness
of vesting or a rule against suspension of the power of alienation,
or both. It would be unprofitable to review this controversy in the
present discussion since all the salient points have been presented
elsewhere. 28 Suffice it to say, that a rule against suspension of the
power of alienation is clearly enacted in the Revised Statutes, and
explained in the notes of the revisers. There is little in the language
of theRevised Statutes or in the notes of the revisers to lend support
to the contention that a rule against remoteness of vesting was also
intended. Occasional references to vesting can be accounted for on
the theory that the statutes were directed at suspension of the power
of alienation by the creation of unvested future interests, contingent
as to the person, in respect of which a provision for vesting at a time
not too remote would remove all difficulty. Thus in section 42 it is
provided, after abolishing the old estate tail, that a remainder limited
thereon shall vest in possession upon the death of the first taker
without issue. Section 13 divides estates into vested and contingent.
Section 16 clearly deals with remoteness of vesting, but such as would
also suspend the power of alienation. In section 21 it is provided
that a contingent remainder on a term of years must vest in interest
within two lives in being. And by section 24 a fee limited upon a
fee must take effect within the period prescribed in this article.
By section 25 future estates in the alternative are provided for where
the first shall fail to vest. On the other hand in sections 14 and is
it is the power of alienation which must not be suspended, and in
section 23 it is the suspension of absolute ownership of a term of
years that is objected to. By section 36 dispositions of rents and
profits shall be governed by rules established in this article in relation
to future estates in lands. In section 128 it is the absolute right of
alienation that must not be suspended by a power.
When we turn to the notes of the revisers there is hardly a hint
that they intended a rule against mere remoteness of vesting un-
2uThat the N. Y. rule was directed at remoteness of vesting; CHAPLIN, SUSPEN-
SION OF THE POWER OF ALrENAION (2d ed. 1911), Chaps. I, VI. Contra, FOWLER,
REAL PROPERTY LAW (3d ed. 199), 261-316; 2 REEVES, REAL PROPERTY (1909)
126o-1266; Canfield, op. cit. supra note 4, page 32 of this volume. For an excellent
summary, see (1920) 5 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 189. As to the common law
rule in general, ibid. note 13, and for early New York cases, notes I, 16.
'"Now R. P. L.§ 32.
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accompanied by suspension of the power of alienation. In speaking
of the abolition of estates tail, and the acceleration of remainders
limited thereon, the following language is used:
"The object of the legislature was to destroy perpetuities, in
other words, to prevent the fee from being rendered inalienable,
beyond a certain period; and this object is completely attained,
if without defeating the remainder, we confine it to vest within
the period allowed by law in other cases...
The attention of the reader is also directed to extracts from the notes
of the revisers quoted on the preceding pages.2 8 1 If they knew of a
common law rule against remoteness of vesting, as seems possible,
it is hardly reasonable to suppose they would have intended to conceal
that knowledge and continue that rule in force by innuendo merely.
If they did not know of such a rule, there is certainly insufficient
evidence that they intended to adopt it. Mr. Stewart Chaplin of the
New York Bar was the ardent champion of the view that the New
York statutes and decisions established a rule against remoteness
of vesting in addition to the rules against suspension of the powers
of alienation.289 It seems probable that his influence led to the
adoption of the rule against remoteness of vesting by the Court of
Appeals in i9o9.290
VIII. SUGGE STIONS FOR MODIFICATION
It is submitted that the present technical and complex rules in
New York, against suspension of the power of alienation of present
and future interests for more than two lives in being, and against
remoteness of vesting, and the cognate rules rendering trusts of real
and personal property indestructible by the trustee and the interests
of beneficiaries inalienable, and destroying such trusts if they exceed
two lives in being in possible duration, are arbitrary and unnecessarily
complicated and hazardous to testators, resulting in a vast amount
of litigation and the failure of hundreds of wills. Moreover, these
rules in their present form are not required by considerations of the
public interest, and were not originally justified by interpretation
of the Revised Statutes, but have resulted from successive increments
of judicial construction. It is further submitted that, without radical
revision or innovation, by a few minor changes, the system can be
made-more simple, more logical and more workable, and such changes
8"Report of Revisers, supra note 249, at 12.
188Supra p. 173 et seg. Cf. Andrews, J., in Walker v. Marcellus, etc., Ry., supra
note 258a.
289Supra note 285. The first edition appeared in i89i.
210Matter of Wilcox, I94 N. Y. 288, 87 N. E. 497 (1909).
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will result in a decrease of litigation and the preservation of wills,
without the hazard of new and difficult hurdles of construction and
definition at the hands of the courts.
The settled policy of the common law has been against permitting
owners and testators to tie up their property by the creation of
remote and inalienable interests. This objection has been extended
in most jurisdictions to unvested future interests, if there is any
possibility that they will not vest in interest within lives in being,
even though such interests may be technically alienable. While not
generally followed, New York and a number of other states have
established a rule against the continuance of an indestructible trust
beyond two lives in being, or beyond lives in being in some of these
jurisdictions. The present writer is not disposed to disagree radically
with either of the three principles just mentioned. Obviously, the
creation of inalienable future interests ties up property and impedes
freedom of commercial intercourse. Even the casual student of
history knows the evils that have resulted from the continuance and
preservation of land laws fashioned by the dead hand of a past
generation. Unvested future interests, even though technically
alienable, are not commercially desirable and cannot be disposed
of at a fair or reasonable valuation, if they are to vest at a time too
remote. As a practical matter, the existence of such interests does
tie up property and clog the flow of commercesQ9a Upon like
principles, it seems that in general the creation of trusts where the
property in question is rendered inalienable should be prohibited or
sharply limited. Furthermore, the creation of indestructible or
spendthrift trusts, to endure beyond lives in being, even though the
trustees may at all times sell or exchange the specific trust property,
is open to like objection.
It respect of the rules as to future contingent interests, the present
system in New York seems particularly objectionable in several
important respects. First, recognition of two objections to unvested
future interests, one based on suspension of the power of alienation
for more than two lives in being and the other based on remoteness
of vesting, is confusing and needlessly complicated. The rule against
remoteness of vesting includes the lesser rule against suspending the
power of alienation by such interests. As was suggested above, all
unvested future interests are open to objection if they will not
certainly vest within lives in being at the creation of the interest.
210a Cf. Rundell, op. cit. supra note 4, page 32 of this volume, (1926) 4 WIs.
L. REv. x, ii. Limitation to two lives was criticised by McCoun, V. C., in Loril-
lard v. Coster, supra note 255, at 196.
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It would seem to be desirable to substitute a rule against remoteness
of vesting for the present double rule.
Second, the limitation in section 42 of the Real Property Law and
section ii of the Personal Property Law to two lives in being seems
entirely illogical, and experience has demonstrated that it gives rise
to needless difficulty in the drafting of wills and deeds, and causes
a vast amount of litigation, since it in effect makes a distinction
between the testator who wishes to provide for only two dependents,
and the testator who wishes to provide for three or more dependents,
with gifts over at their deaths.29 1 Both of these changes could be
accomplished by re-writing section 42292 down to "except" in the
second sentence as follows:
"Every contingent future estate and interest, whether created
by way of remainder or by any other limitation or condition,
shall be void in its creation if by any possibility it will not vest
in interest during or at the termination of designated lives in
being at the creation of the estate or interest;..."
Third, no reason appearing for permitting the designation of lives of
strangers as measuring lives, a new sentence should be added at the
end of the section to that effect.
Fourth, in the interest of simplicity, section 40293 should also be
amended by adding at the end of the second sentence, "or whose
heirs or devisees would be so entitled, whenever and however such
precedent estates might terminate." This would do away with much
2911n Lorillard v. Coster, supra note 255, at 196, McCoun, V. C., said, "I am
at a loss to perceive upon what principle, or for what reason, the statutes should
be made to restrict the duration of trusts of that character (trusts to receive
and apply the rents and profits of land), to the lives of not more than two persons
in being at the time of their creation; when perhaps there may be a large number
equally the objects of care, or whose condition and necessities may alike require
a continuance of the trust during their respective lives. .. "
Cf. Goddard, Perpetuity Statutes (1923) 22 MicH. L. REv. 95, io3 et seg; Gray,
op. cit. supra note 227, § 749.
29Quoted supra note I88, (i927) 13 COizNELL LAW QuARTERLY 67.
2
3R. P. L. § 40, "A future estate is either vested or contingent. It is vested,
when there is a person in being, who would have an immediate right to the posses-
sion of the property, on the determination of all the intermediate or precedent
estates. It is contingent while the person to whom or the event on which it is
limited to take effect remains uncertain." Formerly R. S. § 13. Cf. Gray, op.
cit. supra note 227, § 101, "A remainder is vested in A., when, throughout its
continuance, A., or A. and his heirs, have the right to the immediate possession,
whenever and however the preceding freehold estates may determine. A remain-
der is contingent if, in order for it to come into possession the fulfilment of some
condition precedent other than the determination of the preceding freehold
estates is necessary."
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of the difficulty of determining when future estates are vested and
when contingent in New York. These proposed changes would not
abolish the rule against suspension of alienation by the creation of
future interests, contingent as to the person, since such interests are
contained within the classification of "contingent future interests."
Fifth, for the purpose of consistency, the following changes should
also be made. In section 4624 strike out "not more than two."
Section 49295 should be rewritten beginning with "so that" as follows:
"So that the vesting of a term of years or an interest therein
shall not by any possibility be suspended for a longer period than
during lives in being at the creation of such term or interest."
In section 178,295 "absolute power of alienation" should be
changed to "vesting of contingent future interests."
The writer sees no objection to permitting the limitation of future
contingent interests, to vest after a gross period of twenty-one years,
as it is not always convenient to measure the period of remoteness
by lives. Such gross period should not, however, be allowed in
addition to lives, as at common law.29 7 The statutes could be easily
changed to permit such gross period.
With reference to trusts, the present system seems arbitrary and
needlessly technical and unworkable in the following particulars:
First, it compels every testator and settlor who would create a trust,
to create a spendthrift trust. As has been pointed out above, the
present writer is unable to see any justification for this rule and is
convinced that it was not contemplated by the revisers or the legis-
lature in 1828.298 It should be abolished, but probably the settlor
294R. P. L. § 46, defining the period within which a- contingent remainder on
a term of years must vest in interest.29 R. P. L. § 49, "All the provisions contained in this article, relative to future
estates, apply to limitations of chattels real, as well as of free hold estates, so that
the absolute ownership of a term of years shall not be suspended for a longer
period than the absolute power of alienation can be suspended in respect to a fee."296R. P. L. § 178, defining the period during which the "absolute right of alien-
ation" may be suspended by an instrument in execution of a power.20TThis would provide for such cases as Sawyer r. Cubby, 146 N. Y. 192, 40
N. E. 869 (1895), legacy payable to C on a contingency which must happen
within one year after testator's death if ever; Walker v. Marcellus, etc., Ry.,
supra note 258a, reservation of determinable fee in lime kiln, subject to collateral
limitation, upon which it should pass to grantee of test of land; In re Water
Front, etc., 246 N. Y. I, 157 N. B. 91H (1927), option to be exercised in future
(held valid by Court of Appeals). None of these seem open to objection if limited
to a reasonaole period. Wis. Stat. (1925) §§ 23o.13, 23o.16 permit both 21
years and infancy.
218See the able and vigorous criticism in GRAY, RESTRAIwTS ON ALIENATION
(2d ed. 1895), Appx. I.
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and testator should be allowed to render a trust indestructible for
a limited period only, by express language. For the sake of uniformity
and to bring the law into harmony with the provisions as to future
interests, the period of lives in being is suggested. Second, there
can be no serious objection to the creation of trusts for a period in
gross, properly limited. Such trusts are often urgently needed, and
their prohibition leads to their failure or the arbitrary measuring
of such trusts by lives. The period of twenty-one years has been
selected since it accords with the period of minority and for its
common law associations. The changes suggested below would
accomplish these objects, but would still prevent the creation of
indestructible trusts to which objection might be made.
Subdivision three of section 9699 should be amended to permit
trusts for a gross period of years, by inserting after "shorter term,"
the words "or for a period of not more than 21 years." In section
ioo the second "legal" should be eliminated.310 Section 3o3 (1)301
should be rewritten, beginning with the words "can not," as follows,
"may be rendered inalienable by express direction of the
settlor of the trust in the instrument creating such trust, for the
period of a designated life or lives in being at the creation of such
trust, or for a gross period of not more than 21 years, but not
thereafter. And after the expiration of such life or lives, or period
of years, any competent beneficiary of such trust shall be entitled
to terminate it as to his interest or share by demanding a convey-
ance from the trustee."
This change would abolish suspension of the power of alienation by
the creation of indestructible trusts to continue after lives in being.
Section 109302 should be amended accordingly by inserting after the
first clause, "or when the beneficiary demands a conveyance of the
corpus in accordance with the provisions of section i o3."
Corresponding changes in the personal property sections should be
effected by changing the first four words of section 1 3 03 to "the
vesting of future contingent interests in." And section 15304 should be
299R. P. L. § 96; formerly R. S. § 55, supra P. 33.
3
"
0Supra p. 43 and note 65.
301R. P. L. § IO3 (I), "The right of a beneficiary of an express trust to receive
rents and profits of real property and apply them to the use of any person, can
not be transferred by assignment or otherwise, but the right and interest of the
beneficiary of any other trust in real property mav be transferred."
30R. P L. § 1o9, "When the purpose for which an express trust is created
ceases, the estate of the trustee shall also cease."
3OQuoted supra p. 50.
804p. P. L. § 15, "The right of the beneficiary to enforce the performance of a
trust to receive the income of personal property, and to apply it to the use of
any person, cannot be transferred by assignment or otherwise..."
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amended by striking out the last clause, "cannot be transferred,"
etc., and the sentence following, and substituting,
".... may be rendered inalienable for the period of a designated
life or lives in being at the creation of such trust, or for a gross
period of not more than 21 years, but not longer, by express
written direction of the creator of the trust in an instrument
executed and acknowledged after the manner of deeds conveying
lands, which shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds
in the county where such beneficiary resides at the creation of
the trust, and a certified copy thereof shall be delivered to the
trustee. And after the expiration of such life or lives, or period
of years, any competent beneficiary of such trust shall be entitled
to terminate it as to his interest or share by demanding the fund
or property from the trustee."
This would bring the rules as to alienation and termination of personal
property trusts into harmony with the corresponding rules relating
to trusts of real property. The provisions as to recording are deemed
necessary for the protection of the trustee and assignees and creditors
of the beneficiary, since personal property trusts can be created by
parol, and a settlor who wishes to make the interest of a beneficiary
inalienable should make a written record of that fact.
